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Abstract 
High technology industries with high failure costs commonly use redundancy as a means to reduce risk.  Redundant 
systems, whether similar or dissimilar, are susceptible to Common Cause Failures (CCF).  CCF is not always 
considered in the design effort and, therefore, can be a major threat to success.  There are several aspects to CCF 
which must be understood to perform an analysis which will find hidden issues that may negate redundancy. This 
paper will provide definition, types, a list of possible causes and some examples of CCF.   Requirements and designs 
from NASA projects will be used in the paper as examples. 
Introduction 
Most projects/programs use failure tolerance as the primary and preferred approach to control hazards.  Fault 
tolerance or graceful degradation is the property that enables a system (often computer-based) to continue operating 
properly in the event of the failure of (or one or more faults within) some of its components. Redundancy is used 
most often to provide fault tolerance. But there are instances where all redundant systems fail due to a common 
cause failure mode.  One simple definition of a common cause failure is “a failure of two or more components, 
system, or structures due to a single specific event or cause.” A more complex definition is “an event or cause which 
bypasses or invalidates redundancy or independence, i.e., an event which causes the simultaneous loss of redundant 
or independent items which may or may not include inadvertent operation, or an unintended cascading effect from 
other operations or failure within the system.”  This definition includes the concept of operations.  A major part of 
operations is the human element, which has been shown to be a contributor to common cause failures.  
 
There is some thought that CCF is not typical and does not happen often. Airplane avionics is an example of data 
from a  RGW Cherry & associates paper (Ref 1) which shows that an independent three-leg system has a much 
worse failure rate than three times the failure rate of one leg.  The paper provides similar data for aircraft hydraulic 
systems. In this paper we will discuss some of the types and causes of CCF as well as providing some examples, 
both real and theoretical. We will also discuss techniques for reducing CCF.  
 
Background 
 
There are several contributing factors or causes for a common cause failure.  The following is a brief list of causes 
which can take out redundant components or systems.   Some of the items are inter-related.  
 
System or component requirements (may ignore several CCF factors) 
Wear out (If all similar items are old, they may be reaching the end of life together) 
Contamination (foreign object, chemical degradation, internal generated debris, etc.) 
Corrosion (inter-granular, corrosion fatigue, stress corrosion cracking) 
Environment 
Weather (ice, rain, winds) 
 Lightning/Electromagnetic interference  
 Earthquake 
Thermal conditions  
Loss of power 
Software (the hardware may be redundant but the software is the same version on all units) 
Saturation of signals (under sizing the data handling system) 
Design deficiency 
Lack of process control/manufacturing deficiency (all the items in the lot used are defective) 
Transportation/ shipping  
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Human error/system complexity (e.g. maintenance or installation errors) 
Cascading (multi-channel systems with load sharing)  
Single physical point where redundant items meet (examples: Hydraulic systems (common reservoir or 
common path for lines), Structures, Fire) 
 
Examples 
 
The first example is a theoretical example demonstrating several common cause failure initiators.  This example is a 
RAID (Redundant Arrays of Inexpensive Disks) which is used to redundantly store information. When two disks are 
purchased online and are installed in a computer there can be many common modes of failure. The disks are likely 
from the same manufacturer and of the same model; therefore, they share the same design flaws. The disks are likely 
to have similar serial numbers, thus they may share any manufacturing flaws affecting production of the same batch. 
The disks are likely to have been shipped at the same time, thus they are likely to have suffered from the same 
transportation damage.  As installed, both disks are attached to the same power supply, making them vulnerable to 
the same power supply issues. As installed, both disks are in the same case, making them vulnerable to the same 
overheating events. They will be both attached to the same card or motherboard, and driven by the same software, 
which may have the same bugs or viruses.  Because of the very nature of RAID, both disks will be subjected to the 
same workload and to very (repetitive) similar access patterns, stressing them in the same way. They will also be the 
same age, hence late in life they may both fail at similar times.   
 
An actual example demonstrating single physical point failure is the case of United Airlines Flight 232 which was 
flying from Denver, Colorado to Chicago-O’Hare.  On July 19, 1989 on the DC-10, the number 2 engine (on the tail 
of the plane) experienced a failure which threw shrapnel into the hydraulic lines passing through a 10 inch wide 
channel in the tail.  All three redundant hydraulic systems lost fluid, leading to loss of flight control surface 
actuation.  The pilot used the thrust levers from the two remaining engines (one on each wing) to vary the thrust.  In 
this way, increasing thrust would increase the pitch of the plane, creating a differential thrust between the two 
engines which would yaw/roll the plane.  This technique was not ideal because it was not exact, and it was not 
essentially a fast response.  This control difficulty can be gleaned from the air-to-ground recording in which the pilot 
(Alfred C. Haynes) demonstrates he kept his sense of humor which is vital in these situations: 
Sioux City Approach: United Two Thirty-Two Heavy, the wind's currently three six zero at one one; three 
sixty at eleven. You're cleared to land on any runway.  
Haynes: [laughter] Roger. [laughter] You want to be particular and make it a runway, huh? 
 
The lack of fine control was evident in the approach to the runway.  After dumping the fuel the crew was not able to 
line up on the runway assigned by the tower at Sioux City.  The plane broke up on the runway during the emergency 
landing, killing 110 of the 258 passengers and one member of the eleven member crew.  The pilot managed to use 
thrust modulation to control the aircraft, but this was not a designed-in redundancy for the system.  This redundancy 
while not common to the other flight control method, which used hydraulics, could have been rendered inoperable if 
there was a common system between the two. 
 
An example from the space program for a single physical point is the highly publicized Apollo 13 explosion.  Bare 
wires in the number two oxygen tank located in the service module caused an arc when power flowed through them, 
igniting the liquid oxygen in the tank.  Oxygen tank 1 and its redundant supply, oxygen tank 2, were located directly 
adjacent to each other.  The concussion from the blast also damaged oxygen tank 1, causing it to leak, emptying its 
entire supply to space.  This left the crew with no breathable oxygen in the command module, and no oxygen to 
power the fuel cells.  The crew had to rely on the consumables in the lunar module, stretching them to their limit, to 
make the return trip to earth.  One of the design corrections made to the lunar module after the failure investigation 
was to separate the oxygen tanks, placing them in separate equipment bays, such that a similar failure would have 
less chance of damaging both oxygen tanks.  The lunar module providing redundancy for a situation such as this was 
not considered originally, but the different design and distance from the service module proved to eliminate several 
CCF modes.  
 
 
An example of a cascading failure is the east coast black out of 2003 (ref 3).  In the east coast grid there are several 
sources of generating power, and the lines that carry the power are redundant.  But during the summer when the 
loads are high the system is stressed.  The lines that transmit the power heat up as the through current increases. This 
causes the lines to sag. After one line fails and the current is routed through parallel lines, (not always co-located) 
those lines heat up and sag more. This sag may bring the parallel line into contact with trees or other objects causing 
a short. The breaker tripping increases the load on the other parallel lines. More sag ensues.  See figure 1 from the 
report.  This is the scenario believed to have been a contributor to this failure which shut down over 100 generating 
plants, affecting a total of approximately 55 million people.   
 
 
Figure 1. U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force August 14th Blackout: Causes and 
Recommendations 
 
An example of human error in the airline industry occurred when a DC-10 cabin door blew out on Flight 96 from 
Detroit to New York.   (Ref 4) The DC-10 had an outward swinging cargo door.  An inward swinging door takes up 
more cargo space, but when the plane is under pressure it is held shut.  If an outward swinging door is not latched, 
inside pressure can blow the door out. The outward door required the baggage handler to perform three tasks to 
safely lock the door.  He had to pull down a top-hinging door to shut it, then swing down a lever on the outside of 
the door, and then press and hold a button that operated an electric motor at the top of the door.  With his ear to the 
fuselage, he was supposed to hold the button until he heard a click and wait for seven seconds until he heard the 
motor stop.  If the motor did not finish lowering the latches, the door would appear to be closed until the airplane 
reached an altitude where the pressure was great enough to blow out the door.  The failure modes and effects 
analysis had indicated this.  In a cabin pressure test of its first airplane this scenario happened. The fix was a hole in 
the door for a vent flap that would close when the linkage that shut the door was engaged.  If there was leakage the 
pilots would know there was a problem before the door blew open and they could return to the airport.  An 
additional problem was that the handler could make the vent flap close by excessive force even without the door 
locked.  This is what occurred in Detroit on June 12, 1972.  The doors were notoriously hard to close, so the handler 
was not surprised by the difficulty in closing. He had put his knee on the closing lever and the door shut, but the vent 
flap did not appear correct.  He called a mechanic who opened and shut the door.  The warning light in the cockpit 
went out only because the handler’s weight on the door had bent the metal linkage in the door.   The door was not 
completely locked but  the vent flap was closed.  When the plane reached twelve thousand feet, the door blew open 
and part of the floor collapsed, blocking the cables to the tail. This jammed the rudder.  Fortunately the pilot had 
trained to steer the plane using the two wing engines, and did so successfully, bringing the plane to a safe landing.  
When designing systems for everyday use with human interface, CCF must be closely explored.  
 
Finally a recent example of an environmental CCF is Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant.  In this case the 
backup generators used to generate power if an earthquake interrupted power failed due to the water from a tsunami 
flooding the system.  The thought of the CCF of an earthquake both causing power loss and a tsunami of sufficient 
size to overcome the wall created to protect the plant was not envisioned.   
 
Reducing CCF 
 
Using the list in the background section, a check list of items to look for can be created which will allow the 
engineer to search for CCF modes and eliminate them or reduce their likelihood.  The following examples with 
mitigations explore this. 
Contamination can be a source of common cause failure. In the case of a space system where air flow is required for 
life support, redundant means of performing the function may be required. Contamination can be controlled by a 
number of means; the simplest is a filter immediately upstream of the first fan covers to stop unforeseen 
contamination in the system, see figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
This does not protect the other two fans if there is contamination created by the first fan in the series, which could be 
a cascading failure. See figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
Common protection schemes for failures which cause hazards may insure a hazard does not occur, but the scheme 
may eliminate the function. In the case of a space system where air flow is a life support requirement this would 
create a hazard in itself. See figure 4.  
 
 
 
Figure 4 
The power source could also fail which would lead to the loss of function and therefore a loss of life. See figure 
5.
 
Figure 5 
 
On a space experiment, unlike redundancy is used to reduce the likelihood of CCF.  The purpose of the system is to 
fill a chamber for an experiment from a high pressure bottle.  See figure 6.  For science purposes, the primary 
pressure control is a pressure transducer on the chamber connected to a computer which, operating a solenoid valve. 
If this fails the regulator would keep the pressure below the chamber maximum pressure.  If the regulator fails a 
pressure switch downstream will trip, closing the valve upstream of the regulator, preventing regulator failure-
generated particles from failing the valve.  A filter not shown in the diagram upstream of the valve prevents the 
valve from becoming contaminated by the bottle contents. Finally the chamber pressure switch shuts a valve if the 
chamber pressure is too high.   The use of a regulator, a pressure transducer/computer/valve and a pressure switch 
combined with a valve covers many of the aspects of the above list.  Some of the devices being totally mechanical 
prevent the Electromagnetic Interference CCFM from occurring. All the components are manufactured by different 
vendors. Test procedures for each item are different enough to reduce human error.  Each system tripped at a 
different pressure so that once the system is assembled each control could be tested. This experiment is currently in 
operation on the space station.  
 Figure 6 
Software is a common failure point for most modern systems. The software is expected to handle more of the system 
load from safety critical functions to mundane data handling, and therefore can be very complex.  This leads to 
being unable to foresee all combinations of conditions for the software.  Therefore, not all conditions can be tested. 
Although the hardware may be redundant, the software running on both computers is exactly the same in most cases.  
Failures such as input data out of range, unbounded execution, arithmetic errors, and uninitialized variables or 
pointers will have the same affect on all computers.  Single point software must have internal checks to seek 
problems.  This can be done, for example, by the software range checking input data and including watch dog 
timers.  
Solutions 
One of the most important considerations in reducing CCFM is knowing that they can exist and what the most 
common modes are.  Using a check list from several sources of literature and using a fault tree can help find the 
CCF modes.  A step by step process starts with defining and understanding the system which includes modeling.  
One analytical/modeling technique is to use a fault tree to formally identify failure modes and their interactions. 
There are several sources for performing fault tree analysis, the book “Hazard Analysis Techniques for System 
Safety” (Ref 5) II is an excellent source.  Other models can be useful such as those which show the inputs to the 
system such as power or cooling, show the surrounding environment for the system such as weather or factory floor, 
or show engineering design such as circuit or fluids diagrams.  Reference 5 also has a chapter on a detailed approach 
to CCF analysis.  
Conclusion 
Common Cause Failure modes are prevalent and must be addressed by the safety community.  There are several 
levels that CCF can act upon, and choosing a control at the proper level can provide wide protection.  While unlike 
redundancy is a good start, there are CCF modes which can circumvent unlike redundancy which is why a thorough 
analysis is necessary.  Expressing the concern with the engineering team and discussing simple methods to reduce or 
eliminate CCF will aid in producing achievable results.  
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Introduction
• High technology industries with high failure 
costs commonly use redundancy as a means 
to reduce risk
• Redundant systems, whether similar or 
dissimilar, are susceptible to Common Cause 
Failures (CCF)
• There are several aspects to CCF which must 
be understood to perform an analysis which 
will find hidden issues that may negate 
redundancy
Types of CCFM
• System or component requirements (may ignore several CCF factors)
• Wear out (If similar items are old, they may reach the end of life together)
• Contamination (foreign object, chemical degradation, internal debris, etc.)
• Corrosion (inter-granular, corrosion fatigue, stress corrosion cracking)
• Environment, Weather (ice, rain, winds), Lightning/Electromagnetic interference, 
Earthquake, or Thermal conditions
• Loss of power
• Software (the hardware may be redundant but the software is the same version 
on all units)
• Saturation of signals (under sizing the data handling system)
• Design deficiency
• Lack of process control/manufacturing deficiency (defective lot used for items)
• Transportation/ shipping
• Human error/system complexity (e.g. maintenance or installation errors)
• Cascading (multi-channel systems with load sharing)
• Single physical point where redundant items meet (examples: Hydraulic systems 
(common reservoir or common path for lines), Structures, Fire)
DC-10 Hydraulics
(Single Physical Point)
All 3 redundant hydraulic
systems were cut by 
single engine failure
Non-designed in redundancy, 
using remaining two engines to
control the plane, saved many lives
Power Grid
(Cascading Failure)
• Hot day
– Led to increased power consumption
– Led to power lines sagging
• One set of power lines were lost 
increasing load on remaining lines
– Those lines sagged
All three fans could
be susceptible to 
dirt/debris from cabin
A screen could 
prevent this 
One fan can fail, sending
debris into other fans, 
a cascading failure
Each fan having a 
screen will limit this
Environmental Control Fan 
(Debris Causing Cascading Failure)
On orbit, air flow is required to maintain life
Environmental Control Fan 
(Requirements & Power Failure)
All three fans could
be susceptible to 
loss of power if one
fan has a short
Each fan having a 
fuse will limit this
+    -
+    -
One battery could fail
causing all fans to fail
Redundant batteries
could prevent this 
+    -
+    -
+    -
+    -
Avionics & Software
• Avionics and Software is probably the most 
difficult to assess and prevent
– Unlike redundant avionics are expensive
• May have common electronic components as well
– Unlike software is expensive
• Will have common requirements set
– Understanding all the contributing inputs to software 
is near impossible
– Understanding all the interactions in software is 
improbable
• If possible back up safety critical avionics 
function with hardware only
Pressure fill system
(Unlike Redundancy)
– PT/Processor/Solenoid 
Susceptible to:
• Power failure (if fail open)
• Contamination
– Regulator Susceptible to 
• Corrosion
• Contamination
• Wear out
– Solenoid/PS Susceptible to
• Corrosion
• Contamination
• Power failure (if fail open)
Recommendations
• Perform a Fault Tree Analysis
– Defines interactions and common failure 
paths
– Can be done on system level and can 
performed on subsystems or components 
that contain redundant items which are 
deemed susceptible
• Use a common cause failure list
• Use un-like redundancy when possible
Summary 
• Common Cause Failure modes are prevalent and 
must be addressed by the safety community. 
• There are several levels that CCF can act upon, and 
choosing a control at the proper level can provide 
wide protection. 
• While unlike redundancy is a good start, there are 
CCF modes which can circumvent unlike redundancy 
which is why a thorough analysis is necessary.
